British enter the Bolan Pass: the First Afghan War, 1839

In the previous chapter we saw how the states of Lasbela, Kharan and Makran stood each in its own place around Kalat. With this chapter the fourth part of our story, "the British period", begins. In the spring of 1839 a large East India Company army entered the plain of Kachhi from Sindh, passed through the Bolan Pass and reached Quetta. Its destination was Afghanistan, but this route brought the British and the Khanate of Kalat face to face. We shall keep the accounts of British officers separate from research on the Kalat point of view.

Why did the British go to Afghanistan?

British India feared that Russia was advancing towards Afghanistan. This rivalry was later called the "Great Game". According to the Library of Congress "Country Study", Amir Dost Muhammad Khan of Kabul turned towards Russia when he received no British help. In response, Governor-General Lord Auckland issued the "Simla Manifesto" on 1 October 1838. It said a reliable ally in Kabul was necessary to protect the western frontier, so the deposed king, Shah Shuja ul-Mulk, was to be restored to the throne. John William Kaye in his "History of the War in Afghanistan", and William Dalrymple in his 2013 book "Return of a King", have sharply criticised the plan and its justification.

Earlier, in June 1838, a "Tripartite Treaty" was concluded at Lahore between the British, the Sikh Maharaja Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja. According to the "Encyclopaedia of Sikhism" of Punjabi University, Ranjit Singh signed it on 26 June 1838. Shah Shuja accepted the surrender of territories the Sikhs had already taken, including Peshawar, Kashmir and Multan, and agreed to conduct his foreign policy on British advice.

The "Army of the Indus": from Shikarpur to Kachhi

The force raised for the campaign was named the "Army of the Indus". According to Archibald Forbes's 1892 book "The Afghan Wars", its Bengal column left Ferozepore under Sir Willoughby Cotton on 10 December 1838 and had about 9,500 fighting men. According to Kaye's "History of the War in Afghanistan", the army was also accompanied by 38,000 camp followers and about 30,000 camels. Dalrymple's figures, as quoted by The Friday Times, differ: 1,000 Europeans, 14,000 Company soldiers and 6,000 irregular fighters of Shah Shuja. Eyewitness accounts of the journey were written by Cotton's aide-de-camp Henry Havelock (1840), William Hough (1841) and James Outram (1840).

According to the travel itinerary of FIBIS, the Bengal column stayed at Shikarpur from 16 to 20 February 1839 and moved on on 23 February. From there the route ran across the plain of Kachhi to Dadar, at the mouth of the Bolan Pass. In the 1907 Kachhi Gazetteer, Bhag and Dadar are both listed as separate "niabats" of Kachhi. The catalogue description of Burnes's reports also treats this route as the Khan's territory.

Dadar and the Bolan Pass: dates and hardships

The sources differ on dates. According to an album of India Office press cuttings, the army reached Dadar on 6 March. Forbes writes that Cotton left Dadar on 10 March. The FIBIS itinerary shows Dadar on 14 March and the pass on 16 March. The regimental histories of the Queen's Regiment and the Bengal Light Cavalry give 15 March as the date of entry into the pass. Forbes gives 26 March 1839 as the date of arrival at Quetta.

According to the same cutting, grain had run so short by the time Dadar was reached that camp followers were put on half rations. It describes the pass as about 60 miles long and winding, with neither fodder nor water. An extract from Kaye quoted in it shows pack animals dying along the way. According to Forbes, Cotton left Dadar with animals carrying a partial ration for about a month. According to the cutting, tribal raiders in the pass intercepted the mail, killed stragglers and carried off baggage and cattle.

Burnes and Mir Mehrab Khan

According to the 1907 Sarawan Gazetteer, in 1838 Lieutenant Leech went to Kalat to win the goodwill of the ruler, Mir Mehrab Khan, because the army had to pass through his territory. The visit achieved nothing, and Sir Alexander Burnes was later sent to Kalat from Quetta.

According to the catalogue description of Burnes's reports held in the British Library (India Office Records, 2 March to 20 April 1839), Burnes wanted the Khan to protect supplies coming from Shikarpur and to provide the army with a guard in the Bolan Pass, in return for Rs150,000. Abdul Basit Khan and Ayaz Muhammad (2018), citing Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, also give Rs150,000. A sum of £15,000 given in an article by the Army Institute of Military History, Rawalpindi, comes to roughly the same at the exchange rate of the time. The one differing figure is in Iranica, which, citing Aitchison (vol. 11, p. 209), gives Rs15,000 plus the cost of provisions. According to the same reports, the Khan professed loyalty to Shah Shuja but wavered. He doubted the expedition would succeed and feared the reaction of the Barakzai family, the local population, Iran and Russia.

According to C. U. Aitchison's "Collection of Treaties", on 12 Muharram 1255 AH, about 28 March 1839, Burnes and the Khan signed an agreement at Kalat, to be ratified by the Governor-General. Its preamble mentions the friendship of Shah Shuja and the British government, and says the Khan's forefathers had obeyed the Sadozai royal house. The first article recognises the Khan's rights over his own country. The second says the British will not interfere between the Khan and his subjects.

The accusation: the British account

According to the description of the same British Library file, Burnes alleged that the Khan was in secret contact with Kandahar and was responsible for much of the army's plunder in his territory. Burnes and William Macnaghten agreed on measures to punish the Khan for this "duplicity" and ultimately to depose him. A later proclamation of the Governor-General dated 4 December 1839, published in the London Gazette, said the tribes attacking in the Bolan region were doing so at the instigation of Mir Mehrab Khan, while he claimed friendship.

The Kalat account: the role of the vizier

A British-era gazetteer itself gives the accusation another turn. The 1908 Imperial Gazetteer states briefly that Mulla Muhammad Hasan and Syed Muhammad Sharif deceived Macnaghten and Burnes. The details are in the 1907 Sarawan Gazetteer (pp. 31 to 33). According to it, the Khan had preferred Daud Muhammad, a man of low standing, to the hereditary vizier Fateh Muhammad. About 1833 Fateh Muhammad's son Mulla Muhammad Hasan killed Daud Muhammad and became vizier, but wished to avenge his father. (In Hunter's Gazetteer and the 1840 London Gazette the same vizier appears as "Muhammad Hussain". Both names refer to one man.) According to the gazetteer, the vizier was also behind the failure of Leech's visit, and spread the impression that the Khan had seized and destroyed grain collected for the army. He himself met Macnaghten at Bhag in Kachhi as the Khan's envoy, described his master to the British as ill-intentioned, and on returning to Kalat told the Khan that the British were bent on ruining him. He held the Khan's seal. According to the gazetteer, without the Khan's knowledge he affixed it to letters to the chiefs of the plundering tribes, asking them to harass the army's supplies. Many of these letters fell into the hands of Ross Bell, the Political Agent in Sindh, and were taken as conclusive proof against the Khan. After the agreement with Burnes it was decided that the Khan would go to Quetta to pay his respects to Shah Shuja. But the Khan was convinced that he would be imprisoned at Quetta. On the way Burnes was robbed, and the draft signed by the Khan was seized along with the money. The incident was presented as the Khan's doing.

Muhammad Naeem and Nasreen Afzal write in Qurtuba University's journal "The Dialogue" that the British government falsely accused Mir Mehrab Khan of treachery, and that Mulla Muhammad Hasan had forged letters in the Khan's name written under the royal seals and had sham attacks on the army carried out. According to Abdul Basit Khan and Ayaz Muhammad (2018), the British used the Khan's "betrayal" as a pretext to attack Kalat. According to Dawn's review of the history by Mir Naseer Khan Ahmedzai, a former Vizier-e-Durbar of Kalat, the Khan remained peaceful despite a provocative British letter.

From Quetta the army advanced towards Kandahar. According to the Quetta-Pishin Gazetteer, Captain Bean was appointed political agent at Quetta on behalf of Shah Shuja.

Next Sunday: The fall of Kalat and Mir Mehrab Khan (1839).